Dimensions of Health Security-A Conceptual Analysis. by Stoeva, Preslava
U
NC
OR
RE
CT
ED
 P
RO
OF
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim1700003 (1 of 12)
www.global-challenges.com
Full PaPer
Dimensions of Health Security—A Conceptual Analysis
Q1 Preslava Stoeva
Dr. P. Stoeva
Department of Global Health & Development
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK
E-mail: Preslava.Stoeva@lshtm.ac.uk
The ORCID identification number(s) for the author(s) of this article 
can be found under https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201700003.
Q2
DOI: 10.1002/gch2.201700003
COVID-19 pandemic is a stark example 
of health security politics, despite the 
pandemic not being currently labeled as 
a health security concern in political dis-
course. With high levels of morbidity and 
mortality globally and a highly contagious 
pathogen this pandemic is a prime and 
unprecedented example of a global health 
security threat. Analyses of the politics and 
practicalities of confronting health-related 
threats, of policy options and institutional 
approaches, however, hinge on the way 
these challenges are constructed and on 
the way the dimensions of the concept of 
health security are charted.
In 2015 Horton and Das noted that 
there was no simple definition of health 
security.[5] Indeed, there has been little 
consensus among analysts over the 
meaning and parameters of health secu-
rity.[16–19] These disagreements, Aldis 
argues, have effects beyond analytical 
debates, as they hinder communica-
tions and collaboration on global health 
initiatives, creating confusion and mis-
trust among stakeholders.[18] They also 
inhibit comparative evaluation, critique of 
existing analysis, or the possibility of consistent policy recom-
mendations. Conceptual analyses of the two constitutive parts 
of health security illustrate the difficulties of coming up with a 
simple definition and the inherent tensions and contestations 
in such debates. Given these difficulties, it is argued here that a 
framework for conceptual analysis of “health security,” instead 
of a fixed definition, would provide valuable space to evaluate 
the key features of existing analysis, the explicit and implicit 
assumptions about the nature and parameters of health secu-
rity politics underpinning current policy responses, as well as 
possible alternative conceptualizations and ways of thinking 
about health security.
Health security politics is a burgeoning and contested field 
of analysis and practice with the potential to affect security 
thinking beyond its own parameters. This article aims to con-
tribute to debates both about the scope and meaning of health 
security and about the scope and meaning of security more 
broadly. To achieve this, it first presents a brief review of the 
scope and focus of contemporary conceptual debates of health 
security; second, it applies Baldwin’s[20] framework for the 
concept of security to demonstrate how conservative the cur-
rent definition of health security is; and thirdly, it proposes an 
alternative framing with a view to demonstrate the benefits of 
thinking about health security in broader more inclusive ways, 
which has the potential to improve global responses to current 
and future health-related challenges.
Discussions of the politics and practicalities of confronting health 
security challenges—from infectious disease outbreaks to antimicrobial 
resistance and the silent epidemic of noncommunicable diseases—hinge 
on the conceptualization of health security. There is no consensus among 
analysts about the specific parameters of health security. This inhibits 
comparative evaluation and critique, and affects the consistency of advice for 
policymakers. This article aims to contribute to debates about the meaning 
and scope of health security by applying Baldwin’s (1997) framework for 
conceptualizing security with a view to propose an alternative framing. 
Asking Baldwin’s concept-defining questions of the health security literature 
highlights how implicit and explicit assumptions currently place health 
security squarely within a narrow traditionalist analytical framework. Such 
framing of health security is inaccurate and constraining, as demonstrated 
by practice and empirical observations. Alternative approaches to security 
propose that security politics can also be multiactor, cooperative, and ethical, 
while being conscious of postcolonial and feminist critique in search of 
sustainable solutions to existential threats to individuals and communities. 
A broader conceptualization of health security can transform the politics 
of health security, improving health outcomes beyond acute crises and 
contribute to broader security studies’ debates.
1. Introduction
Discussions of health security periodically climb up the global 
political agenda, mostly in response to global health-related 
concerns and challenges—from public health emergencies 
of international concern and pandemics, e.g., H1N1, Ebola, 
Zika, and the 2019 COVID-19 pandemic,[1–8] to concerns about 
antimicrobial resistance, defined by the World Health Organi-
sation (WHO) as a fundamental threat to human health, devel-
opment and security,[9] and the “silent” noncommunicable 
disease pandemic.[10,11] Academic interest in and appetite for 
health security analysis has not abated either, as indicated by 
recent “Lancet” contributions.[5,12–15] The response to the global 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 
Weinheim. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Global Challenges 2020, 1700003
U
NC
OR
RE
CT
ED
 P
RO
OF
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
www.advancedsciencenews.com
1700003 (2 of 12) © 2020 The Authors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim
www.global-challenges.com
2. Competing Conceptualizations of Health 
Security
Conceptualizations of health security emerged over time in 
response to specific health challenges, political and institu-
tional developments.[21,22] Academic analysis has broadly (with 
a few exceptions) sought to fit health into mainstream security 
studies paradigms instead of using health to broaden security 
debates through reflection on practice and the engagement of 
emerging security paradigms. There is a notable reliance on 
the securitization framework promoted by the Copenhagen 
School[23] to explain the rise to prominence of health concerns 
in security politics, but that, it will be argued here has sup-
ported, validated, even justified a narrow, privileged view of 
health security.
In his overview of the multiple meanings of health security, 
McInnes argues that just like “security,” “health security” is 
“essentially contested” and it is therefore not possible to reach 
an agreement on the meaning and application of the term.[19] 
He observes that the different framings of health security are 
“not amenable to a single set of agreed criteria” because they 
have been constructed to serve a particular purpose, are prem-
ised on different sets of assumptions, have different uses and 
privilege diverse interests and agendas.[19] Such observations, 
however, default on the need for systematic discussion and 
critical reflection on the way health security has been concep-
tualized, or the interests that such conceptualization might be 
serving.
The following brief review of the most common health secu-
rity conceptualizations in historic context highlights the lim-
ited engagement with existing specialist knowledge both from 
across the spectrum of security studies paradigms including 
critical security studies, postcolonial and feminist approaches, 
with specialist knowledge of foreign policy, foreign policy 
analysis, governance, and global health governance or with 
key developments in practice. The failure to engage with the 
broader spectrum of existing knowledge constrains the diver-
sity of discussions, interdisciplinary dialog and learning, as well 
as the possibility of progressive policy impact.
2.1. Health Security as a National Security and a Foreign 
Policy Issue
Links between national security and infectious disease out-
breaks were initially identified by US analysts in the mid to 
late 1990s.[24–29] The promotion of health in developing coun-
tries was included in US National Security Strategies (NSS) in 
1994–1996.[30–32] Infectious diseases were described as a signifi-
cant challenge in low and middle-income countries, contrib-
uting to a slowdown in economic growth. The 1999 US “NSS 
A National Security Strategy for a New Century” was the first 
such document to state that health problems “can undermine 
the welfare of US citizens, and compromise our national secu-
rity, economic and humanitarian interests abroad for gen-
erations.”[33] Health issues of particular interest to the United 
States included food-borne diseases from imported foodstuffs, 
new and emerging infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS. The 
Bush administration re-iterated concerns about the threats 
posed by biological weapons and pandemic health threats but 
did not prioritize health-related security as much.[34] Considera-
tions about national and global health made their way back into 
the US NSS in 2010 and 2015 under the Obama administration. 
Pandemic disease was considered a threat to “the security of 
regions and the health and safety of the American people.”[35]
The first UK National Security Strategy published in 2008 
claimed it was premised on a broader conceptualization of 
national security that included “threats to individual citizens 
and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and inter-
ests of the state”[36] and listed infectious diseases (particularly 
the threat of a global influenza pandemic) and bioterrorism 
as national security concerns. The 2010 UK National Security 
Strategy defined the risk of a severe influenza pandemic as 
one of the top three civil emergencies risks.[37] While the quali-
fication “broader conceptualization” is intended to refer to a 
move away from concerns of defense and military security, the 
narrow focus on bioterrorism and communicable disease is 
symptomatic of traditional, state-centric thinking about security 
from acute threats originating outside of it.
Fidler (2003) provides detailed analysis of the practical ways 
in which the linkages between public health and national secu-
rity have emerged. He concludes that the realpolitik perspec-
tive on national security is driving the development of the con-
cept of public health security in the United States despite three 
other possible formulations—common, human and ecological 
security.[38] Rushton (2011) also observes that health security 
continues to be framed in narrow traditional terms as national 
security and underpinned by particular concerns of interest to 
rich industrialized states, which shape a narrow discourse that 
largely disregards the needs of the Global South.[39] McInnes 
adds that “health issues are not identified as national security 
risks by reference to an explicit set of criteria but rather have 
arisen in an ad hoc manner and been agreed to intersubjec-
tively by key national and international actors.”[19] These obser-
vations inadvertently contribute to normalizing dominant 
political discourses about the paramount nature of the national 
interest, the centrality of the interests of powerful states and the 
relevance of only acute health threats to security thinking.
National security is often considered the key objective of for-
eign policy. HIV/AIDS was framed as a foreign policy problem 
by the Clinton Administration’s Interagency working group on 
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases’ report “Infec-
tious Disease: A Global Health Threat,” and the National Intel-
ligence Council’s report “The Global Infectious Disease Threat 
and its Implications for the United States.” Fidler’s analysis, 
however, mistook US’ foreign policy focus on emerging and re-
emerging communicable diseases and bioterrorism for a global 
trend and a normative shift, claiming that health had achieved 
“pre-eminent political value for 21st century humanity.”[40] Kick-
busch (2002) argued that the US had shaped the international 
agenda to fit in with its national interests and priorities and in 
doing so had preferenced a “unilateral hegemonic approach” 
to multilateral cooperation.[41] The implications of US leader-
ship in shaping the international health security agenda remain 
understudied, and yet critically relevant to what is included and 
excluded from that agenda.
The political recognition of health issues as a matter of 
foreign policy by other states was marked by the 2007 Oslo 
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Ministerial Declaration on global health and foreign policy 
(Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, 
Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand, 2007) and the 
adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 63/33, which 
“recognizes the close relationship between foreign policy and 
global health and their interdependence and… urges member 
states to consider health issues in the formulation of foreign 
policy.”[42] The reason given for linking health policy with for-
eign policy at the international level was that health problems 
of global magnitude were deemed to require cooperative solu-
tions. The international community continues to struggle, 
however, to find such cooperative state-led solutions, as illus-
trated by the response to the Ebola crisis[43] and by the current 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has broadly been 
marked by states leading individual responses. Considering the 
inclusion of health issues on states’ foreign policy agendas as 
novelty, of course, ignores a long tradition of state cooperation 
dating back at least to the 19th century.[44]
The analysis of health concerns as issues of national security 
and foreign policy suffers from some prominent shortcomings. 
Discussions of foreign policy and health make virtually no ref-
erence to analytical frameworks from the field of foreign policy 
and foreign policy analysis, failing to draw on its methodolo-
gies, paradigms and empirical knowledge. In other words, the 
presence of health on foreign policy agendas and its construc-
tion as a threat to national security is observed in practice, but 
not sufficiently interrogated in analytical terms. Furthermore, 
studies often assume generalizability beyond one state (most 
commonly the USA), which has skewed analysis and aligned 
it almost exclusively with dominant paradigms of great-power 
politics, failing to reflect on how health features in the foreign 
policy agendas of a broader spectrum of states.
2.2. Health as an International Security Concern
Health concerns have been conceptualized as international 
security challenges in a number of high-level policy pronounce-
ments. In her role as Director General of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), Gro Harlem Brundtland argued that 
health was an underlying determinant of development, secu-
rity, and global stability and that in an interdependent world 
the functional separation between domestic and international 
health policy lost its meaning.[45] Brundtland advocated inter-
national cooperation in addressing health-related global threats 
because “[a] world where a billion people are deprived, inse-
cure and vulnerable, is an unsafe world.”[45] These observa-
tions are poignantly relevant 17 years on in the fight against the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Further recognition of health issues as “threats to interna-
tional peace and security” is evident in UN Security Council 
resolutions. Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) acknowl-
edged the growing impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa 
on social instability and emergency situations, and stressed that 
if left unchecked, it “may pose a risk to stability and security.”[46] 
This historic resolution was followed by two others—Resolution 
1983 (2011) and 2177 (2014) respectively on HIV/AIDS and 
Ebola. The EU Security Strategy (2003) is another example 
of framing health as an international security threat. It links 
infectious diseases to poverty, economic failure, political prob-
lems and ultimately violent conflict,[47] and also notes the threat 
posed by the potential rapid spread of new diseases and the 
devastation caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
The concept of international security has been discussed 
almost in passing in the security literature by Buzan (1991), 
describing it as focused “on the sources and causes of threats, 
[with its]… purpose being not to block or offset the threats, 
but to reduce or eliminate them by political action.”[48] This 
definition is in contrast to his discussion of national security, 
which focuses on “reducing the vulnerabilities of the state… by 
increasing self-reliance, or by building countervailing forces 
to deal with specific threats.[48] The concept of ‘world secu-
rity” is in the words of Ken Booth “more encompassing than 
the notion of international security… [including] the structures 
and processes within human society… that work toward the 
reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual 
and group lives.”[49] Both concepts—of international and world 
security—are very relevant to thinking about mechanisms 
to reduce health insecurity, but are rarely used by analysts to 
frame interrogations of the nature, scope and focus of health 
security politics. It is curious that there has been so little con-
ceptual analysis of these political statements pronouncing 
health as a global/international security concern.
2.3. Health Security as Human Security
Health security as an aspect of human security has received the 
least attention in the health security literature. Health is one 
of the seven areas identified by UNDP’s “Human Development 
Report” (1994) as pertinent to human security. Much contem-
porary analysis, however, focuses on the mechanisms through 
which health affects human security, and not on the political 
or policy implications of promoting and pursuing human secu-
rity, or indeed on what such health security policy might look 
like. Health as a human security issue is broadly defined and 
premised on WHO’s definition of health as “a state of com-
plete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity.”[50] This in turn means a 
broader view of the range of relevant health threats—going 
beyond communicable diseases and bioterrorism, to include 
for example noncommunicable diseases, neglected tropical dis-
eases; as well as considerations about the social determinants 
of health. This view considers “the many other health chal-
lenges faced by more vulnerable groups who are amongst those 
most affected by the burden of disease.”[51] Proponents of this 
approach further note that health threats are experienced most 
acutely by marginalized groups and communities and that 
gains in health anywhere in the world benefit everyone every-
where.[52] Takemi et  al. argue that a human security approach 
can contribute to improvements in health because it focuses 
on the needs of communities, recognizes people’s vulner-
abilities and strengthens the interface between protection and 
empowerment.[53]
Critics have argued that human security does not have suffi-
cient political traction,[19,39] building on critiques of the concept 
as being too broad to serve as a guide for academic research 
or governmental policy making.[54] While the term “human 
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security” might have lost political traction, however, the value 
of promoting human-centered security is deeply embedded in 
existing human rights norms and humanitarian law, as well as 
doctrines such as the responsibility to protect. This calls for fur-
ther substantive analysis of the positioning of health security in 
a broader normative and political context. As the Commission 
on Human Security has suggested individual and state security 
need to be considered as complementary—an avenue for anal-
ysis that remains largely unexplored.[52]
All the different framings above share a conscious or an 
unconscious drive to embed public health concerns into 
existing frameworks for thinking about security. As Barkawi 
and Laffey posit, however, “security relations today [sic] are 
about the contradictions between old security logics and new 
security problematics.”[55] Health security politics provide an 
accurate illustration of these tensions between understandings 
of security as a zero-sum game between great powers and the 
everyday realities of challenges posed by disease and ill-health, 
affecting the life and well-being many across the world. These 
tensions, however, cannot be reconciled by the old security the-
ories, premised on old security logics, because they are partly 
the cause of the problem.
Analysis, instead, needs to draw on practice and emerging 
security paradigms. New frameworks for analyzing security 
politics include, but are not limited to cooperative security,[56–60] 
multiactor approaches to security politics,[61,62] ethical security 
studies.[63] These are particularly relevant to analyzing health 
security politics, which, as will be discussed, include complex 
interactions between public and private actors, aim to address 
issues that transcend national borders, and affect individuals 
and groups more acutely than states. A synthesis between alter-
native security approaches and empirical insight would provide 
a solid foundation for a more pragmatic understanding of how 
the political realms of health and security intersect and indeed 
interact.
3. The Concept of Health Security
Conceptual clarity is key in situating analysis, generating 
comparable findings, and facilitating understanding of com-
monality and diversity, argues Baldwin.[20] It is the first step in 
facilitating meaningful scholarly engagement and the develop-
ment of policy proposals that are “comparable with each other 
and with the policies of pursuing other goals” and can easily be 
evaluated by end users.[20] The questions that define the concept 
of security are: “Security for whom? Security for which values? 
How much security? From what threats? By what means? At 
what cost?”[20] This framework is applied here with a view to 
highlighting implicit and explicit assumptions made about 
the nature and scope of health security politics in the existing 
literature.
Some of the questions from Baldwin’s framework have been 
used to frame discussions of health security already in two 
influential works by Simon Rushton—“Global Health Security: 
Security for Whom? Security from What?”[39] and Security and 
Public Health.[64] There are two main issues with these works—
first, Rushton’s analysis, as will be discussed below, is cautious 
and does not push conceptual boundaries far enough to explore 
the outer limits of health security; and secondly, these works 
only partially engage with Baldwin’s framework, meaning that 
Rushton’s analysis does not give us a 360° view of the impli-
cations of assumptions made in relation to each aspect of the 
concept of health security.
3.1. Security for Whom?
Mainstream theories of International Relations (IR) and secu-
rity studies assume the state as the main referent object of 
security.[65] Current health security analysis is also predomi-
nantly premised on this assumption. While some studies assert 
it explicitly,[39,66,67] most do so implicitly by either discussing 
security only in relation to health threats that challenge states’ 
strategic interests,[29,68,69] or by examining health as a foreign 
policy or national security concern, both of which are by defini-
tion state-centric.[28,38,40,70] The main consequence of focusing 
on the state as the sole referent object of security is that only 
a narrow set of health problems, which are perceived to cause 
acute state instability, state failure or destabilize other interstate 
relations, qualify as relevant security challenges, while many 
others remain ignored, excluded, and understudied.
Direct threats to state security are perceived to emanate 
from diseases that cause large-scale morbidity and mortality, 
cross national borders and affect populations, rather than just 
individuals.[71] It has been argued that such diseases are desta-
bilizing for states only in extreme circumstances—by affecting 
the health status of military personnel or peacekeepers,[69] by 
undermining state structures and political stability, by exacer-
bating existing political instability, or by impacting the labor 
force and the economy, and reversing years of economic devel-
opment.[72–74] Even in these situations, however, the impact of 
ill-health would be most acutely felt by individuals and com-
munities. Diseases (both communicable and noncommuni-
cable) pose an existential threat to individuals, affecting their 
own and their families’ sense of daily security, stability, predict-
ability, well-being, economic, and development prospects, in 
a way that cannot be experienced at state-level. What is more, 
ill-health is the most relevant existential threat to people with 
9 out of the top 10 causes of death worldwide being health-
related,[75,76] which makes a strong argument for promoting 
human-centered security. Baldwin argues that conceptually, and 
for purposes of specifying the concept of security, individuals, 
states, the international community can all be considered rel-
evant referent objects of security.[20] But while such analysis is 
central to gaining a more accurate and nuanced understanding 
of dynamic and evolving security problematics globally, existing 
security, and international relations paradigms are poorly 
equipped for such multiscalar analysis.
3.2. Security for Which Values?
Traditional IR theories consider the preservation of the sov-
ereignty, autonomy, and territorial integrity of states as core 
values to be secured.[77–79] The raison d’etre of the state is to pro-
tect itself from external invasion or transgression, they argue, 
and it is only by ensuring its own security that the state is able 
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to guarantee the security of its people. Baldwin argues that in 
practice, other values are sometimes added to the national secu-
rity agenda and that the values, which are being pursued by 
security politics ought to be clearly specified, so as to assist ana-
lysts in evaluating their relative importance and resource needs 
in comparison with other policy objectives.[20] Importantly, 
Baldwin further argues against specifying security objectives 
in absolute terms, because absolute security is unattainable, 
which justifies his next question about the degree of security 
sought in a particular issue area.
Political and normative developments in international poli-
tics demonstrate that the spectrum of values that states have 
agreed to secure is growing. This is illustrated by the emer-
gence of concepts such as human development,[80] human 
security,[81] responsibility to protect.[82–84] Increasing attention 
has been paid to the protection of civilians in inter-state con-
flicts through the growing body of international humanitarian 
law. States have further committed to seeking individual crim-
inal responsibility for acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by accepting the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and thus offering further protection for 
people from the exigencies of uncontrolled power.[83] The influ-
ence that these norms and values are having on security policy 
is understudied by both traditional and critical security studies. 
These norms demonstrate a shift in values toward securing and 
protecting individual life and population well-being, alongside 
traditional state security.
Most analyses of health security do not engage in depth 
either with this evolving international normative context or 
with security studies paradigms that are more human-centered. 
Health security studies struggle to effectively reconcile the 
values pursued by public health—i.e., the protection and pro-
motion of the health of communities and traditional security 
studies—identified as existential threats to states.[16] The values 
to be secured according to this literature, therefore, continue to 
be the stability and integrity of states—by means of preventing 
internal instability and state vulnerability that may be caused by 
high morbidity and mortality, and external instability caused by 
state failure and conflict. Since assumptions about what values 
ought to be secured are implicit in the health security literature, 
the implications of these choices for security policy have not 
been sufficiently evaluated.
3.3. How Much Security?
At first glance, this question might appear futile and its answer 
obvious—surely, more security is always better. Baldwin clari-
fies its significance—“[i]n a world in which scarce resources 
must be allocated among competing objectives, none of 
which is completely attainable, one cannot escape from the 
question ‘How much is enough?” and one should not try.”[20] 
Morgenthau sets out the realist position on this question: “all 
nations must allocate their scarce resources as rationally as pos-
sible” to guarantee national survival.[85] Offensive and defensive 
neorealists agree, but disagree on whether state security is best 
achieved through gaining the “appropriate amount of power”[78] 
or through the maximization of power relative to other states.[86] 
In practice, increasing spending on the pursuit of some values 
invariably means reducing spending on the pursuit of others. 
In a world where most states are not “great powers,” the scope 
of security politics is richer and much more nuanced than pre-
sented by IR theories.
The question of “how much security” has not been 
addressed at great length in the health security literature. The 
literature has broadly operated on the assumption that should 
health-related issues be “securitized” successfully, they will get 
the resources needed, which is in line with traditional secu-
rity thinking on the issue. The scale of resources committed 
to addressing health crises, however, has so far been decided 
on an ad hoc basis, primarily by donors (public or private), and 
has often reflected the perceived proximity or scale of a health 
threat to national security as argued by Rushton.[64] Thus, for 
example, a recent round of replenishment for the Global Fund 
to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria saw donors pledge 
nearly $13 billion.[87] These diseases carry a similar burden of 
morbidity and mortality as some noncommunicable diseases, 
which have not received nowhere near as much funding.[10,88–92] 
Nuclear defense spending in the UK and US, for example, far 
outweighs pandemic-preparedness spending, as highlighted 
by the current coronavirus pandemic. Further analysis of the 
theory and practice of framing health security challenges is 
therefore urgently needed, with attention drawn specifically to 
existential threats facing individuals and communities.
3.4. From What Threats?
Threats to security are traditionally defined as being external to 
the state, predetermined by the anarchic structure of the inter-
national system, and military in nature.[78] The sharp decline in 
violent interstate conflicts and conflict-related deaths, however, 
as noted by the Human Security Report Project,[93] threatens to 
deprive these studies of an object. Does this mean, then that 
states and people are secure? One could hardly say so. With the 
majority of conflicts taking place within states and involving at 
least one nonstate armed group,[94,95] (with the intensification 
of violence against civilians, increasing intractability of con-
flicts and the spread of violent conflict to middle-income coun-
tries (Iraq, Syria, Ukraine), assumptions about the nature and 
causes of conflict are continuously being challenged.[95] The 
human cost of these conflicts is currently born extensively by 
civilians.[96] In addition to conflict, people across the world lead 
daily battles for survival against disease, poverty, malnutrition, 
environmental degradation, climate change, lack of access to 
clean water, safe food, basic health services, against political 
oppression, gender-based violence, and so on. In this context, 
Baldwin’s argument that there is no reason to limit the con-
cept of security to narrow, vague references at the expense of 
referring to practical threats that are comported with common 
usage,[20] is particularly relevant.
The health security literature has broadly kept in line with 
traditional security approaches on this question as well, by 
focusing analysis primarily on issues with a crossborder impact 
on national security, which has led to an overall narrow focus 
on health-related causes of insecurity—namely, emerging 
and re-emerging infectious diseases (ERIDs) and bioter-
rorism.[21,64,97,98] Some scholars have acknowledged that this 
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focus is too narrow, proposing the inclusion of other issues 
such as internal state instability and illicit activities and an 
increased engagement of health security with public health 
and not just with the concerns raised by the foreign policy and 
security communities.[66] This, however, is only a marginal 
broadening of the agenda, which fails to engage with two cen-
tral questions—the protection of individuals and communities 
from danger, hazard and risk; and the much more complex 
question of whether security policy is just about negative secu-
rity “security from” or whether consideration should be given to 
positive security as “security to.”[99] McSweeney also talks about 
the importance of considering “structural” threats, namely, the 
unintended consequences of social action[99] – the structure of 
the global economy, the pattern of power relations and depend-
encies within it, the profound influence of the food, tobacco 
and alcohol industry on government policy, gender inequality, 
levels of relative and absolute poverty, income inequality, etc. 
This is not to say that the health security literature is not cog-
nizant of these, just that they have not been explored system-
atically and in sufficient depth, because too much attention has 
often been focused on dealing with acute threats.
3.5. By What Means?
Sovereignty grants states legitimate monopoly over the use 
of violence. Employing the sovereign authority of states to 
respond to security problems is usually synonymous with the 
threat or use of military force or other types of coercive action. 
Baldwin argues that the “specification of this dimension of 
security is especially important in discussions of international 
politics” and expresses concern that tendencies to define the 
field entirely in terms of the threat and use of military force 
“can prejudice discussion to favor of military solutions to secu-
rity problems.”[20] Improving and securing health, for example 
cannot be achieved by military means, even though military 
personnel and logistics can and have been utilized in emer-
gency responses. Pursuing security through nonmilitary means 
requires a human-centered focus and cooperative approach, 
where states engage not only with each other but also with a 
broad spectrum of nonstate actors. In security politics the state 
is increasingly becoming one actor among many, but with a key 
facilitating function in delivering security to individuals and 
communities.
Responses to health security challenges involve a broad spec-
trum of public and private actors, including intergovernmental 
organizations, inter-agency cooperation, civil society organi-
zations, philanthropic foundations, corporate actors, etc.—
making for a complex governance architecture and a dynamic 
combination of various means and resources. The role of this 
panoply of actors has been explored in the context of global 
health governance,[100–102] but not sufficiently so in the context 
of security politics, where the dynamics of governance inter-
actions are distorted. In addition, promoting and improving 
health requires investment in infrastructure, education, knowl-
edge development, in lifting people out of poverty, enhancing 
food and environmental security, all of which require concerted, 
cooperative efforts. This is a different model of thinking about 
security politics and appropriate security policy, compared 
with the zero-sum game, military, confrontational approaches 
proposed by mainstream security studies. Some analysts pro-
mote the concept of “cooperative security,”[60,103–105] premised 
on the changing nature of security threats as well as changing 
practices of security governance. This is an emerging fields of 
security analysis on which health security studies ought to draw 
more extensively.
3.6. At What Cost?
Even though the assumption that security ought to be pursued 
at any cost is at the heart of traditional thinking about secu-
rity politics, such conceptualization is unrealistic in most situ-
ations. As Baldwin points out—“costs always matter.”[20] There 
are virtually no instances in practice where no restrictions on 
the means and costs of responding to a threat to security are in 
place, nor where other values are not competing for or having 
to be sacrificed in the distribution of scarce resources. This is 
not a question that has been examined in great detail either in 
mainstream security studies or in the health security literature, 
suggesting that analysts have adopted the traditional, excep-
tionalist frame of thinking about security, whereby a successful 
“securitizing move,” automatically guarantees the availability of 
“sufficient” funds and resources to address security threats.
Addressing threats to security stemming from ill-health 
requires resources that go beyond the cost of medicines, as has 
become apparent through campaigns dealing with the spread 
of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, the fight against polio, and 
recent infectious disease crises—Ebola, Zika, and the Covid-19 
pandemic. The Global Health Security Agenda launched in 
2014, by the United States together with 28 other states, WHO, 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Organi-
sation for Animal Health, is one such attempt to promote activ-
ities aimed at strengthening “core capacities… of public health 
systems needed to protect global health security.”[106] Analysis of 
the relative cost of security through the improvement of health 
and the alleviation of existential threats through the strength-
ening of health systems can be of particular importance in 
setting out domestic and global security priorities, but also in 
raising the required funds. Cost is in many situations an inhib-
iting factor in pursuing particular interventions, despite evi-
dence of the need for the latter. It should therefore always be a 
significant consideration in any health security policy analysis.
3.7. In What Time Period?
Mainstream international relations theories do not make a sig-
nificant distinction between long-, medium-, and short-term 
security goals. Their atemporal approach to security is prem-
ised on the assumption that the causes of conflict and insecu-
rity do not change over time, due to the unchanging character 
of the anarchic international system.[107] Ahistoric realist and 
neorealist analysis seeks to justify the perpetual need to invest 
in military resources. In his brief discussion of this aspect of 
security, Baldwin warns that short-term security politics often 
respond to an immediate threat, but a longer-term strategy for 
security may well conflict with the short-term approach.[20]
Global Challenges 2020, 1700003
U
NC
OR
RE
CT
ED
 P
RO
OF
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 
www.advancedsciencenews.com
1700003 (7 of 12) © 2020 The Authors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim
www.global-challenges.com
The existing health security literature does not tend to 
explore medium and long-term policy horizons, despite the 
pertinence of such temporal considerations to a broader view of 
health security. The health security literature has mainly taken 
an interest in current crisis[1,3,108–110] with the aim of under-
standing the politics and institutions involved in the responses 
to these. And while such analysis is important and relevant, 
conclusions often point toward the need for a medium and 
long-term planning and investment. Improvements in overall 
health security require much more than pandemic prepar-
edness measures, including investment in the development 
of healthcare infrastructure, health systems strengthening, 
training of medical personnel. Addressing the root causes of 
noncommunicable diseases, for example, may not be possible 
in the short-term, as they necessitate regulation and preventive 
action, which takes time to negotiate and implement as well as 
longer term planning and infrastructure investment. Thinking 
about health security in differentiated time frames, therefore, 
could allow for a broader range of goals to be pursued, for more 
effective distribution of resources between acute and long-term 
needs and for pursuing goals of prevention, while also pro-
viding care where needed.
4. Dimensions of Health Security
Baldwin’s concept of security provides a structured and com-
prehensive framework for thinking about health security. It 
promotes systematic thinking about the assumptions and prac-
tice of health security politics that is not confined by the rigid 
ontologies of traditional security paradigms, but is open, flex-
ible, and practice oriented. This conceptual framework enables 
the combination of rich empirical insight from existing studies 
of health security with a broader spectrum of approaches to 
security studies, to not only enhance understanding of polit-
ical dynamics, but to also generate pragmatic policy options, 
accommodating of normative considerations. This section sets 
out new parameters for health security analysis that go beyond 
the constraints of traditional security studies. These require fur-
ther analysis of practice and engagement with alternative secu-
rity frameworks to inform health security policy on how best 
to address persistent criticisms and shortcomings. Baldwin’s 
guiding questions are grouped in three categories—ontological, 
normative and material considerations, and discussed in turn.
4.1. Ontological Considerations—Security for Whom  
and by Whom?
Concerns about the security of individuals have continuously 
been embodied in new international legal norms and made 
part of the global policy agenda over the course of the last few 
decades. The post-Cold War years “exposed the fragility of the 
state in the face of complex forces within it and of trans-state 
limitations on its practical sovereignty outside it.”[99] Instances 
of conflict, civil strife, political instability, state fragility, and 
now of the COVID-19 pandemic are reminders that states are 
not always able or willing to guarantee the security of their 
citizens. The dominant view of security as a state-centric 
concept has been presented by its proponents “not as an 
option, a choice, but as the only one which is valid and rel-
evant… [but] the assumption of security studies which ignores 
the human dimension is contradicted by the practical depend-
ence of policy-makers and theorists alike on the human indi-
vidual as the ultimate referent, or subject of security,” argues 
McSweeney.[99]
The argument in favor of foregrounding the security of 
individuals and communities in conceptual and theoretical 
debates is supported by practice. Its relevance is particularly 
obvious in the context of (ill)health, which is probably one of 
the most prominent existential threats to humans, alongside 
environmental and food security. If the survival of individuals 
is not safeguarded, the survival of social structures and insti-
tutions loses its significance. Contextualizing the security of 
individuals and groups in relation to and within state security 
is an area of security analysis that needs further attention in a 
changing landscape of political conflict—examples include the 
health security of populations in the context of civil war, failed 
or fragile states,[111–113] or the provision of health-services in ter-
ritories held by nonstate groups, e.g., rebels, guerrilla groups, 
ISIS; or the security of women and girl refugees fleeing con-
flict.[114,115] Empirical evidence needs to be brought to bear on 
understandings of security politics in general and health secu-
rity in particular.
In addition to analyzing the relationship between individual, 
group, and state security, attention needs to further focus on the 
“providers” of security, which increasingly include specialized 
nongovernmental organizations, public–private partnerships, 
philanthropic foundations, multilateral agencies, and others. 
It has been assumed that this dynamic governance architec-
ture is still under the control of sovereign governments, but 
there is little evidence to support that, particularly in contexts 
of conflict, fragile or failing states such as Syria, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, South Sudan. Rushton and Williams’ “Partnerships 
and Foundations in Global Health Governance,”[101] Harman’s 
“Global Health Governance,” and[102] Jeremy Youde’s “Private 
Actors, Global Health and Learning the Lessons of History”[116] 
are useful starting points in outlining the architecture of health 
governance, but further analysis is needed to reflect on the idi-
osyncrasies of security-focused governance and politics. Gjorv 
(2012) advocates the need to adopt a multiactor security model 
to explore the patterns of security-related governance, which 
she argues is prompted not only by normative considerations, 
but is a reflection of the empirical realities facing security prac-
titioners, illustrating her argument with two examples civil-
military operations and climate change in the Arctic.[62]
Baldwin’s conceptualization of security demonstrates that 
restrictions on the referent object of security are superficial. 
When health-related risks and challenges pose an existential 
danger, they need to be considered as security risks, in recog-
nition that individual and community security is as relevant a 
consideration to state security and vice versa. Health-related 
existential threats to individuals and communities are further 
exacerbated by poverty, political instability, state fragility, con-
flict, and civil strife. But since state security can both determine 
and be determined by the security of individuals and commu-
nities, and since there are other actors involved who impact 
or are impacted by such insecurities, a more comprehensive 
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understanding of the politics and frameworks of health security 
policy making is urgently needed.
4.2. Normative Considerations—Security for Which Values? 
From What Threats? How Much Security?
Despite traditional theories of international relations dis-
counting normative considerations in matters of security and 
national security, such considerations are always present. As dis-
cussed earlier, adopting a narrow state-centric, militaristic view 
of security is both an option and a normative choice, and not 
the only possible or valid one. This is the premise of much cri-
tique from critical security studies, as illustrated by works such 
as Krause and Williams,[117] Barkawi and Laffey,[55] Booth,[49] 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams,[118] Sjoberg,[119] Wibben,[120] and 
Shepherd.[121] Some analysts are further advocating considera-
tion of security in terms of both positive and negative security, 
where negative security aligns more with traditional notions of 
security as “security from,” while positive security is seen as 
enabling and emancipatory—“security to.”[62,99,122] Such a lens 
enables values such as human life, life in good health, life with 
dignity, to be placed at the center of security strategy and policy, 
which in turn demands that security politics become more 
inclusive, more protective, less focused on privileged views and 
experiences of security, more human-centric. Framing secu-
rity as a positive value creates space for considerations such as 
health system strengthening, the provision of primary care and 
universal health coverage, the prevention of noncommunicable 
diseases, to be given greater policy priority, which as analysts 
have argued would not only improve health outcomes overall, 
but could also strengthen health responses to acute crises.
Health is an important value on a global scale, as evidenced 
by the Constitution of the WHO (1948), the Alma Ata Decla-
ration (1978), the International Health Regulations (2005), the 
Sustainable Development Goals (2015), along with the intrinsic 
value of human life, which is the bedrock of all international 
human rights norms, treaties, and declarations. If life and 
good health are the values to be secured, however, state poli-
cies would have to go beyond seeking to protect individuals 
and populations from emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases and bioterrorism and take into account a broader spec-
trum of health-related existential threats to people. Diseases 
posing significant risks to people in low- and middle-income 
countries include among others neglected tropical diseases 
(NTDs)[123–125] and noncommunicable diseases. NTDs’ burden 
of disease measured in DALYs ranked these diseases fourth 
after lower respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, and diarrheal 
diseases, preceding malaria, TB, and measles.[123] “Noncom-
municable diseases (NCDs) are the leading cause of death glob-
ally and one of the major challenges of the 21st century.”[126] 
An estimated 71% of all deaths globally in 2016 resulted from 
NCDs, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reports. Over 
the next 20 years, NCDs will cost more than USD 30 trillion, 
pushing millions of people below the poverty line.[127] Much 
like other global problems, health insecurity disproportionately 
affects low- and middle-income countries, as well as the poorest 
and often most disadvantaged strata of societies in high-income 
countries. An infectious disease pandemic like COVID-19 
further worsens health outcomes by compacting morbidity, 
exponentially increasing mortality and creating a perfect storm 
even for the relatively well-resourced health systems in high 
income countries.
Securing health and well-being is an important goal in a 
dynamic portfolio of values that need to be protected. How 
much attention should be devoted to health overall, and to spe-
cific health concerns, or the needs of particular groups within 
this portfolio, are questions that needs to be examined further 
and in greater detail, drawing on studies of public health in 
individual states and across borders. The answer to the question 
“how much security” is also likely to vary over time. Analysis of 
the relative threat posed by a given health issue to individual, 
community, and state security is a valid consideration for health 
security politics—using a structured framework to enable com-
parative analysis is central to health security analysis. Due to 
the relatively high morbidity and mortality, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has demonstrated that health threats can be elevated to 
almost absolute, primary status. Actions taken to contain the 
pandemic have included social distancing measures, limiting 
travel, shutting down economies, governments promising to 
pay salaries, support private businesses, etc., which are meas-
ures that appear unthinkable in most other cases. In the midst 
of this crisis, however, it is important to remember that pan-
demics of such scale and scope are relatively rare and to use 
COVID-19 more as an extreme example than a baseline one.
4.3. Material Considerations—By What Means? At What Cost? 
In What Time Period?
Contrary to traditional security approaches premised on the use 
of military means, health security (whether broadly or narrowly 
defined) requires the employment of nonviolent, cooperative 
measures—including investment, humanitarian aid, develop-
ment assistance, multiactor cooperation, coordination, sharing 
of information and expertise, etc. As discussed previously, the 
cost of addressing health security problems is significant, due to 
the need to establish and support a functioning health system, 
to train and retain professional staff, to create infrastructure 
that facilitates the functioning of the health system, but the cost 
of inaction is high and puts lives at risk. The challenges posed 
by public health emergencies of international concern and 
pandemics can be exceptionally far-reaching and damaging—
globally, locally, trans-locally, as illustrated by the current spread 
of the SARS CoV2 virus. The human cost of this pandemic has 
been unprecedented in recent history, the economic costs are 
yet to be calculated with more than a quarter of the global pop-
ulation in lockdown, international travel restricted and econo-
mies shrinking fast. In a world of scarce resources, the means 
for securing health and the cost of doing it are pertinent policy 
considerations, which need to be examined in conjunction with 
the opportunity cost of both not investing in health security and 
of investing in a different field.
The short-termism and immediacy of conventional security 
politics is counter-productive in approaching problems such as 
anti-microbial resistance, noncommunicable diseases, maternal 
and infant mortality. Even responses to public health emergen-
cies of international concern, in the form of communicable 
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disease outbreaks, have demonstrated the need to develop 
a systematic approach—including properly resourcing the 
work of the WHO, investing in health systems strengthening 
and infrastructure. The 2011 report of an Independent Review 
committee on the H1N1 response noted that “The world is ill-
prepared to respond… to a global, sustained, and threatening 
public health emergency” as health capacities were not on a 
path to timely, worldwide implementation.[43] The international 
community collectively and states individually appear to have 
squandered the time since 2009 to prepare for the next global 
pandemic. The health systems in high-income countries are 
buckling under the weight of the COVID19 pandemic. Con-
cerns are growing over its effects the pandemic will have on 
low- and middle-income countries. In the conclusion to their 
discussion of the global response to Zika virus, Gostin and 
Hodge point out that the apathy and short-sightedness of the 
international community must change, as the consequences 
of fast-moving epidemics are comparable with humanitarian 
crises, climate change, and war.[6] Such analysis and current 
events clearly illustrate that planning has to include the short-, 
medium-, and long-term and might be more effectively organ-
ized at the global level, as states are better off responding 
together than individually.
To sum up, this discussion of the dimensions of health secu-
rity demonstrates that health security can be conceived of as 
focusing on the security of people, communities, and states, 
if we accept that health security politics are centered on the 
protection of the core values of life and life in good health. 
Since health security is concerned with issues that both pose 
an existential threat to people and also threaten and destabi-
lize communities, its significance ought to be ranked rela-
tively high. Health security politics need to be viewed both 
as being embedded within the existing normative context of 
human rights and as themselves promoting a range of values—
including dignity, respect, nondiscrimination, emancipation, 
and empowerment. The pursuit of health security requires 
material resources like any other type of security. Part of the 
politics surrounding health challenges center on competition 
for attention and scarce resources. The resources required for 
the enhancement of health security can be significant, as they 
involve developing infrastructure, training health professionals, 
the delivery of care, ensuring the accessibility of medicines, dis-
ease prevention, health promotion, and strengthening health 
systems.[128] Conceptualizing health security in this way, calls 
for a more holistic approach to encompass both the important 
work done through responses to global health emergencies 
and the need for medium- and long-term policies, because in 
health, just like in strategic politics, prevention is always better 
than cure.
Thinking about health security in a systematic way simul-
taneously highlights the idiosyncrasy of the health security 
field compared with other fields of security politics and dem-
onstrates the interconnectedness and overlaps between them. 
Baldwin’s concept of security provides a guiding framework, a 
structured conceptualization through which to rethink the way 
in which health security has been imagined. The flexibility of 
ontological assumptions that it provides opens possibilities 
for health security studies to connect with contemporary secu-
rity paradigms, defying the stereotypes, and constraints of 
traditional thinking about security. At the very least, it provides 
a structured framework that allows for comparative analysis of 
competing accounts of security politics with diverse paradig-
matic assumptions. The framework is able to accommodate not 
just conceptual debate but observations of and reflections on 
practice.
5. Conclusion
This article sought to contribute to debates about concep-
tualizing health security and understanding health security 
politics. It set out to challenge the use of traditional security 
paradigms, which obscure the significance of public health 
threats to individual and community security and well-being. 
The current COVID-19 pandemic has brought these issues to 
the fore with a much sharper focus than previous public health 
emergencies of international concern. The brief overview of the 
different denominations of health security demonstrated that 
the grounding of existing analysis in securitization theory and 
constructivist thought has been driven in part by the desire to 
validate the claim that health-related challenges were indeed 
relevant security concerns, and in part by the need to fit within 
existing debates. Overall, as has been demonstrated, health 
security analysis has remained predominantly anchored to the 
securitization approach, despite critiques levied at the Copen-
hagen school by critical and feminist scholars.[129–131] Health 
security analysis has only marginally engaged with related 
bodies of work in the fields of foreign policy, human security 
or with alternative security paradigms, which has limited the 
field’s dynamism, critical edge, and ability to influence policy 
debates.
This article applied Baldwin’s framework of the concept of 
security to existing conceptual and empirical studies of health 
security to demonstrate how narrowly health security has been 
conceptualized and how much more analysis is needed for a 
better understanding of this complex field. Traditional security 
analysis is broadly inhospitable to claims that health issues 
are a relevant security consideration, leading some analysts 
to reject the relevance of health to strategic security instead 
of questioning whether the way that security is framed and 
defined is still relevant to political and strategic realities and 
practice.
Baldwin’s framework helps liberate health security analysis 
from the dogmatic assumptions of traditional security theories, 
while at the same time providing a structure for rigorous, com-
prehensive and comparable conceptual debate. Experimenting 
with novel thinking about the ontological, normative and mate-
rial considerations in health security can help push the bounda-
ries not only of the health security field, but of security studies 
overall. Particular questions for further research emerge—e.g., 
about the relationship between individual, community and 
state security, about the way in which resources are allocated 
to specific fields of security politics, about the differences in 
short-, medium-, and long-term planning in health security 
politics, about ways in which to evaluate the relative importance 
of competing security challenges, the relationship between per-
ceptions and indicators, and so on. The exploration of these 
questions, based on a clear, explicitly defined concept of health 
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security will promote more systematic thinking about security 
politics that is open, flexible, and practice oriented.
Taking a broader, more holistic and historically grounded 
approach to understanding the politics of health and security 
brings its own set of challenges. A comprehensive rather than 
parsimonious way of thinking would inevitably complicate 
analysis, as it incorporates more variables and tries to capture 
more, not less of the political and social complexities of security 
policymaking. Questions about normativity and ethics need to 
be considered. Drawing on knowledge across disciplinary bor-
ders is rarely unproblematic, as ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological differences may hinder multidisciplinary 
dialog. None of these difficulties, however, are insurmountable, 
as demonstrated by novel approaches to security studies, on 
which health security analysis ought to build.
The pressing needs to rethink the dimensions of health secu-
rity has regretfully been validated by the unfolding COVID-19 
pandemic. Writing in the midst of this crisis, it is difficult to 
assess what the implications of this pandemic would be for 
societies, economies, health systems. The issues that the pan-
demic is bringing to the fore, however, are not new. Academics 
have grappled with and tried to draw attention to some of these 
for at least the last 20 years.[132] SARS CoV2, the virus that 
causes COVID-19, is a health security threat—make no mis-
take about it. This virus poses an existential risk to humans—
it threatens individuals, but impacts on communities and on 
almost every aspect of societal life—family life, social relations 
and activities, culture, education, the economy, government. 
Governments around the world are using an unprecedented 
spectrum of measures to reduce morbidity and mortality, previ-
ously unseen in peacetime.
The WHO has repeatedly noted that the response to the pan-
demic would be most effective if states work together in a spirit 
of cooperation, solidarity, and care. States need people, busi-
nesses (including private health care providers) and voluntary 
organizations to support the pandemic response, which is an 
illustration of multiactor security politics coordinated by gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations. There is no 
doubt that this pandemic will bring about change—the extent 
and nature of the change is currently unknown. What the pan-
demic has illustrated so far, however, is the need for health sys-
tems strengthening, for deepening of global coordination and 
cooperation, and a stark need to critically reflect on the way we 
conceptualize security in general and health security in par-
ticular without leaving the individual and communities out.
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